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1
Turkey has been an associate member of the EU since 1963 and an official candidate to EU
membership since 1999. The European Council of December 2004 finally scheduled to open
negotiations in view of Turkish accession to the EU on 3rd October 2005
2. The December
decision provoked intense reactions all across political forces as well as among European
citizens. The debate over Turkey’s accession has been a far more intense one than that
which surrounded the start of negotiations with the accession countries of Central and
Eastern Europe (CEECs) in 1998. Irrational reactions from the public opinion in EU Members
States – or real response to the specificities of the Turkish enlargement?
After presenting a brief history of the EU-Turkish relationship (§1) and examining whether the
Turkish enlargement bears either political, economic, geopolitical or cultural particularities (§
2), this paper explores the grounds on which the European Commission recommended the
opening  of  the  negotiations  (§  3).  Finally,  in  light  of  the  specificities  of  the  Turkish
enlargement  highlighted  in  part  2,  the  implications  of  the  Council  Decision  to  open
negotiations in view of Turkey’s accession to the EU are discussed (§ 4).
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1.  HISTORY OF EU-TURKISH RELATIONS
The decision to open negotiations in view of Turkey’s accession to the EU followed a nearly
50 years long history of various forms of “partnerships” between Turkey and the EU. The
major  phases  of  this  relationship,  essentially  based  on  increased  economic  and  trade
relations between the EU and Turkey, are presented here.
1.1.  The Association Agreement
Ever since its foundation in 1923, the Republic of Turkey has remained closely aligned with
the West. It adhered to the Council of Europe in 1949, became a full member of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1952 and an associate member of the Western
European  Union  (WEU)  in  1992.  Turkey’s  relationship  with  the  European  Economic
Community (EEC) began in 1959, with Turkey’s application for associate membership of the
EEC. An Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and Turkey, the so-called
“Ankara Agreement”
3, was signed in 1963 and came into force in 1964. The Association
Agreement envisaged a “stage by stage” integration process culminating, providing the
successful completion of the preparatory and transitional stages, in the establishment of a
customs union between the parties, with consideration of eventual Turkish membership of
the EEC
4. In order to achieve the objectives of the Association Agreement, three Financial
Protocols allocating funds for the economic development of Turkey were signed in 1964,
1973 and 1977 respectively.
The Association did not gain any substantial form before 1970, when the EEC and Turkey
signed an Additional Protocol
5,  which  came  into  force  in  1973.  The  Additional Protocol
established a timetable of technical measures to be taken in order to attain the objective of
the Customs Union within a period of 22 years
6.
1.2. The Turkish military regime: the freezing of the EU-Turkish relationship
Following the military coup in Turkey in 1980, the Community decided to freeze its relations
with Turkey and block the signing of the fourth Financial Protocol. The collapse of the
democratic regime meant that there was no further chance for Turkey to be accepted as a
candidate for full-membership status in the foreseeable future. Relations were gradually
normalised after the restoration of a civilian government in 1983.
1.3. The Customs Union
In 1987, Turkey applied for full membership to the EEC. The Commission rejected Turkey’s
application in 1989, on the basis of its economic instability and its human rights record.
However, the Commission explicitly endorsed Turkey’s eligibility for membership.
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Further  progress  was  achieved  in  1995,  when  the  Association  Council  adopted  the
agreement creating the EC-Turkey Customs Union
7, which entered into force in 1996. The
EC-Turkey Customs Union was the EC's first substantial functioning customs union with a
third state. A consultation body, the Customs Union Joint Committee, was set. The launch of
the Customs Union, which allowed Turkey preferential access to the single market, was an
important step in Turkey’s progress towards becoming a more competitive economy.
1.4. The Helsinki decision
After EU Heads of the State declined again to grant candidate status to Turkey at the
Luxembourg Summit of 1997, the Helsinki European Council of  1999  finally agreed on
the candidate status of Turkey
8. Turkey was accepted in principle as a candidate State for
membership, whose application was to be assessed on the basis of the same criteria as
other candidate States. These criteria are the “political” criteria set at the Copenhagen
European Council in June 1993
9 – namely that that the candidate country achieve “stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and
protection of minorities”. Compliance with the political criteria is a prerequisite for the opening
of the accession negotiations
10, while compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria, including
economic ones, is necessary for accession to the Union
11.
On the basis of the proposals already laid down by the Commission in March 1998
12, the
Helsinki Council adopted the “European Strategy for Turkey”, designed to stimulate and
support reforms in Turkey during the pre-accession phase
13. The Programme was welcomed
by the Turkish government.
1.5. The Accession Partnership
In March 2001, the Council of the EU adopted the EU-Turkey Accession Partnership as a
key element of the existing “European Strategy for Turkey”
14. The purpose of the Accession
Partnership was to assist the Turkish authorities in their efforts to meet the accession criteria,
with particular emphasis on the political criteria and the issue of human rights. It fixed the
priorities on which accession preparations had to concentrate in light of the Copenhagen
political  and  economic  criteria  and  the  implementation  of  the  acquis  communautaire.
Turkey’s Accession Partnership was complemented by Turkey’s own National Programme
for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), giving details of Turkey’s commitments with regard to
achieving the Copenhagen criteria and adopting the acquis.
In December 2002 the Copenhagen European Council concluded that “if the European
Council  in  December  2004,  on  the  basis  of  a  report  and  a  recommendation  from  the
Commission, [decided] that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU would
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open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay”
15.  In  the  meantime,  EU  leaders
agreed to extend and deepen co-operation within the framework of the EC-Turkey Customs
Union and provide Turkey with increased pre-accession financial assistance. In May 2003,
the Council of the EU revised the priorities of the Accession Partnership with Turkey
16.
In October 2004, the Commission presented the 2004 regular report on Turkey’s progress
towards accession, in which it recommended the opening of accession negotiations with
Turkey
17.
2. SPECIFICITIES OF THE TURKISH ENLARGEMENT
The long-lasting debate over Turkey’s accession has been a far more intense one than that
which surrounded the start of the negotiations with the accession countries of CEECs in
1998. At first sight, the Turkish enlargement looks as somewhat similar to the current “big”
enlargement towards the East. Turkey is about the same size as the ten new Member States
taken together in population and approximately the size of Poland, in economic terms. But
Turkey is only one country, not ten, and the political impact of its accession would therefore
be quite different (§2.2). Turkey is also characterised by its difficulties to comply with the
democratic and human rights standards as defined in the Copenhagen criteria (§2.3) and by
an unstable economic situation (§2.4). And finally, Turkey has a predominantly Muslim
population. For the first time, the EU has been discussing the accession of a country that has
different religious and cultural characteristics (§2.5). The way towards Turkish accession is
peppered  with  hurdles  that  were  not  experienced  by  the  EU  with  other  enlargements.
Conversely, the advantages that were brought to the fore by policy-makers and the media
with regard to the Turkish enlargement are also unprecedented: Turkish membership has
been analysed essentially in geopolitical strategic terms (§2.1).
2.1.   A Strategic Enlargement
Turkey’s EU membership has been justified by a nearly exclusive reference to strategic
considerations.  If  the  Eastern  European  enlargement  also  raised  foreign  policy
considerations,  economic  or  identity  arguments  remained  dominant  in  the  debate.  By
contrast, the potential of economic or identity related advantages that may be tied to the
Turkish enlargement have been barely discussed by EU (and US) policy makers.
In  its  October  2004  Report  focusing  on  the  issues arising from Turkey’s membership
perspective”
18, the Commission points to Turkey’s capacity “to contribute to regional and
international stability”. In consideration of the new political objectives and security concerns
of the EU, Turkey’s role can indeed be significant in terms of providing stability in the regions
of the Eastern-Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Caucasus
19. The EU could have a
pacifying influence in Southern Caucasus, where difficult historical ties between Turkey and
Armenia  and  the  conflict  over  the  Nagorno-Karabakh  enclave  between  Armenia  and
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Azerbaijan are still a factor of instability in the region. Turkish accession will also increase the
EU’s interests in the Black Sea region, though the prior accession of Bulgaria and Romania
will already have given the Union borders with Black Sea countries. However, extending the
EU’s borders to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, Iraq, Iran and Syria also means that the
EU will be drawn closer to several regions of continuing political instability.
Some policy makers and commentators have also argued that the future Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) would be crippled without the South Eastern flank of Europe.
Turkey has emerged as a regional power in the Eastern Mediterranean and its importance
has increased in recent years. In order to realize the CFSP and for the EU to maintain the
security  of  its  adjourning  regions,  Turkey’s  membership  is  seen  as  indispensable.  The
development of a common European security policy would definitely be facilitated if Turkey
did  not  sit  between  the  transatlantic  chairs  as  a  NATO-member  without  EU  affiliation.
Turkey’s integration to the EU would primarily mean a fortification of the European position in
the transatlantic pact.
Turkey also has a strategic location with respect to Europe’s future energy supplies from the
Middle  East  and  more  importantly,  from  the  Caspian  region
20.  Ultimately  the  countries
surrounding Turkey supply 60 percent of the natural gas and petroleum demand of Europe.
Turkish accession could help secure access to these resources and their safe transportation
into the EU single market. It would diversify possible EU supply lines offering alternative
export outlets both for Russia, the Middle East and the countries around the Caspian. Turkey
is expected to develop further as a major oil transit country for, in addition to Turkey’s control
of the vital Bosphorus route from the Black Sea Mediterranean, Turkey is also a transit
country for important energy networks including the northern Iraq-Ceyhan pipeline and the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. For gas, Turkey will become an increasingly important transit country
between the enlarged EU and the Caspian producers as well as the Middle East.
Last but not least, Turkey, as a secular and “partly free”
21 Islamic country, has also been
presented  to  the  European  public  as  a  potential  “bridge”  to  the  Islamic  world.  Turkish
membership could  in  this  respect  represent  a  chance  for  the  EU  to  play  a  role  in  the
reconciliation of Islam, democracy and the West.
2.2.   A Politically Sensitive Enlargement
EU Member States' concerns over Turkey's human rights record has been a key factor
behind  Turkey's  prolonged  application  process.  In  the  Freedom  House  organisation’s
2003/2004 evaluations of political rights and civil freedoms, Turkey is considered as a “partly
free  country”,  with  a  worse  grading  than  new  EU  members,  as  well  as  Bulgaria  and
Romania
22.
However, in its October 2004 Report, the Commission emphasises Turkey’s considerable
progress concerning political criteria
23. In the past three years Turkey has indeed achieved a
notable level of legislative and practical progress. Since October 2001, 8 reform packages
have  been  passed,  with  the  4  later  major  ones  under  the  Erdogan government. They
included measures to eliminate regulations and practices that had contributed to impunity for
torture and ill-treatment. The death penalty has been abolished, laws on the forming of
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associations and the right to  assemble have been liberalised, and religious and ethnic
minorities have acquired greater legal rights (in particular the ban of Kurdish and other
languages has been lifted)
24. After heated controversies with the EU over the criminal status
of adultery, a new penal code was passed (which has however not entered into force so far).
So are current reforms sufficient for Turkey to be considered as a free democratic country?
Despite these promising developments allegations of torture are still recurring. In 2003 the
European Court of Human Rights laid 76 charges of human rights violations against Turkey.
Shortcomings in the legal area also remain. Freedom of expression is sometimes restrained
(disproportional force used against demonstrators) as well as freedom of religious belief
(restricted property rights for non-Muslims).
Most importantly, Turkey’s secular character has so far been ensured by the military. Its
influence has however been reduced. In August 2004 the first civilian was appointed as head
of the powerful military Council in Turkey. Yet, the crucial question of whether the retreat of
the military from supervision of the political process will lead to a sustainable democracy
remains.
2.3.   A “Difficult-To-Manage” Enlargement: Turkey’s Demographic Situation
One commonly raised point is that, when it joins the EU, Turkey will become the EU's most
populated  Member  State.  Turkey's  current  population  is  71  million,  and  demographers
project it to increase to 80-85 million in the next 20 years. This compares with the largest
current  EU  Member  State,  Germany,  which  has  83  million  people  today,  but  whose
population is projected to decrease to around 80 million by 2020
25. Turkey’s political weight
would be comparable to that of Germany, based on voting weight by population share.
Opponents to Turkish accession therefore argue that Turkey will be a too powerful member
for the EU
26.
There is further concern that Turkish membership may seriously impede further development
of the Union
27. This fear is boosted by the fact that Turkey’s economy is characterised by
major regional inequalities, partly reflecting its rural/urban divide.  Many fear that it will be too
difficult  for  the  EU  to  digest  the  Eastern  enlargement  and  then  engage  in  another
enlargement of almost the same dimension at the same time.
2.4.  A Costly Enlargement ?
Turkey’s economic situation, if still very fragile, does not constitute a distinctive impediment
to  its  accession  compared  with  former  (or  planed)  rounds  of  enlargements.  Turkey’s
economic situation is comparable to that of Bulgaria and Romania, which are part of the
second round of CEECs. Turkey’s per capita income level was 12, 3% of the EU-15 in 2003.
The per capita GDP of Romania and Bulgaria reach only 10% of EU-15 levels. Structural
indicators like the contribution of agriculture to employment (Turkey 34%, Romania 34%,
Bulgaria 27%) and to the national economy (all around 11% to 13%) are also similar
28.
                                                   
24 See § 3.1 for more details on the reforms that were initiated by the Turkish government since 1998.
25  See  dossier  on  EU-Turkey  relations,  Euractiv website, http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-
129678-16&type=LinksDossier.
26 See § 4.3.1 for an analysis of the institutional impact of Turkish membership.
27 See H. Kramer, Whither Turkey’s EU Accession? Perspectives and Problems After December 2004, Paper
presented at the AICGS Conference, 20 September 2004, Berlin.
28  K.  Hughes, Turkey and the European Union: Just another Enlargement? Exploring the Implications of
Turkish Accession, A Friends of Europe Working Paper, 2004.7
Moreover, unlike other new EU members, Turkey does not have to radically restructure its
economic system. Rather, the basic structures of a market economy are secured.
Turkey’s main problem lies in the macro-economic imbalances that characterise the country.
Periodic crises and lapses in growth (1999 and 2001) have been a prominent feature in
recent  years.  Furthermore,  high  state  influence  and  recurring  internal  and  external
disequilibria (high debt and inflation) still typify the Turkish economy.    However, after the
crisis  of  2001,  the  economy  has  returned  to  a  growth  path,  inflation  has  reduced,  the
currency  has  stabilised  and  debt  indicators  have  improved.  If  it  cannot  be  established
whether this is the beginning of a sustainable higher medium and long term growth path, it
seems, however, that Turkey’s economic situation does not constitute a major obstacle – if
compared to that of first round CEECs and second round CEECs – to its membership.
2.5.   An Unprecedented Issue: Is Turkey “European” and what is the “European
Union”?
The question of Turkish membership has elicited a debate on “whether Turkey is European”.
Christian Democrats, as well as some sections among Social Democrats and European
Federalists, have argued that Turkey has a different culture, is Asian (the explicit argument),
or is Muslim (the more or less implicit argument)
29.
Geography has been one of the major arguments in this debate. Turkey entertains relations
with its neighbours on the Black Sea, Central Asia as well as the Middle East. It is, by many,
seen as being “outside” Europe’s natural boundaries. Yet others argue that its belonging to
the European sphere was recognized as early as the 1950s, due to its participation in the
Council  of  Europe,  NATO  and  the  European  Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation
(ECSP).
The  second  argument  relates  to  Turkey’s  history.  Some  argue  that  Turkey  was  not  of
Europe: it does not share Europe’s Judeo-Christian heritage and rationalist tradition, seen as
the  roots  on  which  European  identity  is  founded.  Well  rooted,  if  sometimes  irrational,
resentments and even fears go back to Muslim invasions of Europe in the 8
th century,
Ottoman occupations of the Balkan from the 14
th Century, and the empire’s defeat before
Vienna in 1683. The contemporary manifestation is fear of massive migration from Turkey to
Europe. However, others point to the fact that these very Byzantine and Ottoman empires
have also shaped Europe
30. Moreover, with the advent of Kemal Atartük’s modernist agenda
in the 1920s, Turkey chose Europe, its political institutions and the idea of a secular state.
There remains the argument over “Islam and the West”. The EU is identified by some as a
“Christian club” where non Christians may only form minorities. The issue is whether, against
the  background  of  a  largely  Islamic  society  and  a  state  whose  secular  character  is
guaranteed by the military, European values can be anchored and sustained. Thus, Turkish
membership  is  seen  as  having  an  important  political  cultural  dimension,  which  did  not
emerge with previous enlargements. At the heart of this debate lies the core issue of what is
Europe, and more fundamentally, what is the nature of the European Union project itself.
The Turkish enlargement bears specificities. EU Heads of the State have nevertheless
decided in 1999 to assess Turkey’s application for membership on the basis of the same
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criteria applied to other states. It is in the conditions applied upon the negotiations process in
view of Turkey’s accession that the EU leaders’ concerns over the particularities of the
Turkish enlargement are reflected
31.
3. THE POSITION OF THE COMMISION CONCERNING TURKEY’S ACCESSION
Since 1998, the Commission has published annual reports on Turkey’s progress towards
accession to the EU. The reports measure, in political and economic terms, the progress
made by Turkey in preparing for membership. They are carried out on the basis of the criteria
set out by the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 and the parameters of the
“European Strategy for Turkey” adopted in 1999. The Copenhagen criteria are related to the
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, respect of human rights and
the protection of minorities (the so-called “Copenhagen political criteria”); the existence of a
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to compete in the Union market (the
“Copenhagen  economic  criteria”);  and  the  ability  to  take  on  the  obligations  of  EU
membership. In light of these criteria, the Commission reports have consistently pointed out
Turkey’s economic weaknesses, but laid greater emphasis on the country’s democratic
deficits.
3.1.  The position of the Commission on the political criteria
While acknowledging that the basic features of a democratic system existed in Turkey, the
first Commission reports
32 (years 1998, 1999) assessed a general no compliance with the
Copenhagen political criteria, stressing in particular the existence of serious deficiencies
concerning the respect of human rights and the protection of minorities.
In 2000, two important steps were taken by the Turkish government in order to engage with
the  process  of  political  reform  required  by  the  EU.  Various  international  human  rights
instruments were signed and the Turkish government endorsed the work of the Supreme
Board of Co-ordination for Human Rights. However, the situation on the ground hardly
improved and the Commission’s position on Turkish progress towards accession did not
change
33.
In October 2001, the Turkish Parliament adopted the first major constitutional reform in the
field of human rights and fundamental freedoms – which, most noticeably, limited the use of
capital punishment. A reform of the judicial system was also initiated, and in November 2001
a new Civil Code was adopted. The Commission welcomed these legislative changes, but
reminded Turkish authorities of the need to properly implement the legislative reforms and
address a series of fundamental issues, such as civilian control over the military, corruption
and restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms
34.
In 2002, despite the adoption of reform packages concerning the death penalty, the state of
emergency in the South East, and the strengthening of democracy and protection of human
rights – considered to reflect the willingness of the majority of Turkey's political leaders to
move towards further alignment with the Union’s values and standards, the Commission
reiterated that the Copenhagen political criteria were not met
35. Firstly, the reforms contained
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a number of significant limitations concerning fundamental rights and freedoms – and most
noticeably the freedom of expression. Secondly, most of the reforms were not implemented.
Thirdly, a number of important issues, such as the enduring usage of torture, the power of
the military, the situation of persons imprisoned for expressing non-violent opinions and the
non compliance with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), had yet
to be adequately addressed.
From 2003 onwards, the Turkish government showed greater determination to achieve the
Copenhagen political criteria and engaged in further legislative reforms. The Commission
stressed the importance of these legislative efforts but at the same time concluded that a
series of key issues, in particular the strengthening of the independence and the functioning
of the judiciary, the overall framework for the exercise of fundamental freedoms (association,
expression  and  religion),  the  further  alignment  of  civil-military  relations  with  European
practice, the situation in the Southeast and the cultural rights, still had to be addressed
together with the question of the implementation of the reforms on the ground
36.
In May 2004 the second major constitutional reform took place, eradicating all remaining
death penalty provisions, strengthening gender equality, broadening freedom of the press,
aligning the judiciary system with European standards and establishing the supremacy of
international agreements in the area of fundamental freedoms over internal legislation. In
September  2004  Turkey  adopted  a  new  Penal  Code,  meant  to  improve  the  situation
regarding, in particular, women’s rights, discrimination and torture. Furthermore, a new Press
Law was adopted in June 2004 and a new Law on Associations and a Law on Compensation
of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts were approved in July 2004. A number of regulations
and  circulars  were  issued  by  the  authorities  in  order  to  enable  the  implementation  of
legislation. In its October 2004 Report
37 the Commission confirmed that Turkey had achieved
significant legislative progress in a considerable number of areas and stressed the efforts
made in implementing the political reforms. For the first time, the Commission concluded that
Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria – but emphasised that reforms
still needed further consolidation. On the basis of the mandate received in Copenhagen in
December 2002, the Commission was able to formulate its – positive – recommendation as
to whether Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria
38.
3.2. The position of the Commission on the economic criteria
In its first assessments of the economic situation in Turkey, the Commission concluded that
although Turkey was close to becoming a market economy, major progress still had to be
achieved in order to comply with the Copenhagen “economic” criteria –   which refer to the
existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive
pressure and market forces within the Union.
The 2000 and 2001 Commission reports indicated that the progress attained in addressing
the major imbalances of the economy had been counteracted by the financial crisis of
November-December 2000. Turkey was confronted with another financial crisis in February
2001, which hampered any further economic progress. In 2002 the consequences of the two
financial  crises  still  weighted  heavily  on  the  Turkish  economy.  Nevertheless  the  2002
Commission report welcomed the progress reached by Turkey regarding the functioning of
the Turkish market.
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In its 2003 report, the Commission confirmed that significant progress had been made
concerning the functioning of a market economy in Turkey, but recommended that Turkey
initiate further steps to improve its macroeconomic stability and launch structural reforms to
enhance its capacity to cope with competitive pressure within the Union.
It was in 2004 that the Commission, for the first time, held the opinion that if the stabilisation
policy was maintained and further structural reforms were initiated, Turkey should be able to
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. On the basis of this
assessment,  the  Commission  concluded  favourably  on  Turkey’s  compliance  with  the
Copenhagen  “economic”  criteria  –  recommending,  however,  that  Turkey  continue  the
ongoing reform process.   The Commission also emphasised that Turkish accession could
bring positive effects to the economy of the EU, provided that the negotiations take into
account the specificities of the Turkish economy.
3.3. The recommendation of the Commission: a “qualified yes”
39
In its Recommendation on Turkey’s progress towards accession
40, the Commission stated
that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and recommended the opening of the
accession negotiations – without however fixing a concrete date.
The Commission expressed great caution in its recommendation. It recommended that the
“green light” to the beginning of the accession negotiations be contingent to the fulfilment of a
number of conditions. Thus, the Commission suggested that the negotiation process include
specific  clauses  that  did  not  appear  in  former  accession  negotiations  –  including  a
“Suspension Clause”
41. In order to reiterate the conditional character of its recommendation,
the Commission defined the negotiation talks as “an open-ended process whose outcome
could not be guaranteed beforehand”, and thus not leading automatically to accession.
Furthermore,  with  the  purpose  of  ensuring  that  reforms  be  properly  implemented,  the
Commission drafted recommendations providing for a close monitoring of the situation in
Turkey.
The Commission's recommendation suggested a three pillar strategy for the conduct of the
negotiations: (1) strengthened cooperation to reinforce and support the reform process in
Turkey; (2) negotiations adapted to the specific challenges related to Turkey’s accession and
(3) a substantially strengthened political dialogue bringing people together from EU Member
States and Turkey.
4. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECISION
The European Council of December 2004 finally decided to open negotiations on 3
rd October
2005  in  view  of  Turkish  accession
42.  The  heated  debates  which  surrounded  Turkish
membership before the European Council Decision were an “avant-goût” of the intense
reactions provoked by the December decision all across political forces as well as among
European citizens. After presenting the European Council Decision itself (§4.1), the short-
term implications of the Decision – with regard to the reform process in Turkey, the evolution
of Turkey’s relations with Cyprus and reactions that have been provoked in Member States –
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will be examined (§4.2). Its long-term institutional, economic and geopolitical implications for
the EU will then be analysed (§4.3).
4.1.  A Conditional Accession
As recommended by the Commission, several conditions were imposed upon Turkey’s road
towards accession
43. If the European Council welcomed "the decisive progress made by
Turkey in its far-reaching reform process and expressed its confidence that Turkey will
sustain that process of reform", it also pointed to the necessity for Turkey to bring into force
the six specific items of legislation identified by the Commission – among which the New
Penal Code and the Law on Associations
44.  Furthermore the European Council underlined
the need to implement the zero-tolerance policy relating to torture and ill-treatment.
The Decision then defines the elements of the negotiation framework. It declares that long
transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses “may
be considered” for areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or
agriculture.   The possibility for the negotiation framework to include “permanent safeguard
clauses” for certain policy areas was strongly criticised by Turkey, who had already signalled
its dissatisfaction with this condition ahead of the European Council.   Furthermore, it is
foreseen that accession negotiations with states whose accession could have a substantial
financial impact on the EU budget, as it is likely to be the case for Turkey, will only be
concluded after the establishment of the Financial Framework for the period from 2014.
Moreover,  the  Council  reserves  itself  the  right  to  decide  by  qualified  majority  on  the
suspension of the negotiations in the case of “a serious and persistent breach in a candidate
state of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded”. Turkey is worried about the
clause which allows the Council to recommend the suspension of negotiations, in the event
of non compliance with political criteria.
Finally, while stating that accession is the negotiation’s objective, the European Council –
following  the  Commission’s  recommendation  –  defined  negotiations  as  an  open-ended
process, with no guaranteed outcome beforehand.
4.2.  Short-term impact of the Decision
4.2.1. Turkey’s de facto recognition of Cyprus
The sticking point of the negotiations was the EU's requirement that Turkey would sign a new
customs  accord  with  Member  States,  involving  a  de  facto  recognition  of  Cyprus
45.  A
compromise was finally reached, in which Turkey agreed verbally to sign up the protocol on
the adaptation of the “Ankara Agreement”
46 – by which Turkey would recognise the 10 new
Member States including Cyprus. The lack of written commitment on the Cyprus issue was a
major concession granted to the Turkish government by the EU. On 29 March 2005, the
Commission announced it had received a formal letter confirming Turkey's intention to sign
the protocol extending its customs union with the EU to 10 new members, including Cyprus.
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However,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  signing  of  the  protocol  is  not  a  legal  and  formal
recognition of the Republic of Cyprus”
47.
4.2.2. Political reforms in Turkey
Since  1999,  major  political  reforms  have  been  implemented  in  Turkey,  promoting
democratisation, better respect of human rights including minority rights and in the area of
civilian control of the military. The objective of EU membership has certainly been a very
important framework in underpinning these reforms.
Yet, these reforms came along with a loss of power for the military and other parts of the
secularist establishment. While the loss of control of the military over the state is a necessary
step towards full democratisation, there is a widespread fear among secularists that growing
Islamic conservatism would ensue – with pressure for women to adopt the veil frequently
cited. In this respect, the EU could potentially help to ensure a continued separation of state
and religion, and guarantee that a weakening of the power of the military does not open the
door to fundamentalism.
4.2.3. Reactions in Member States
Given the persistence of strong political opposition to Turkish accession in a number of EU
states, it was likely that the decision to open negotiations with Turkey in 2005 would be
received with dismay by certain political factions and the European public. Countries that
have  expressed  the  strongest  reluctance  included  France,  Austria,  Denmark  and  the
Netherlands. France is the only Member State where opposition to Turkey’s EU membership
predominates at both levels – government and society. French President Jacques Chirac
found himself in a troublesome situation. His willingness to ride out doubts and opposition
from  his  own  party  was  confronted  to  the  fact  that  he  feared  that,  in  the  event  of  a
referendum on the European constitution, right-wing political circles would not miss out on
the opportunity to couple the public decision about the EU Constitution with the question of
Turkey’s accession. French President Chirac however opted for a strong back up to Turkish
accession, while opponents led by Nicolas Sarkozy, head of the governing UMP party in
France, continue to express their reservations. Yet, current opinion polls on voting intentions
for the referendum on the EU constitutional treaty seem to prove Chirac’s fears right.
But the French case is not isolated. A recent poll found that 76% of Austrians were against
Turkey's accession. The Dutch public is also known to be predominantly against Turkey's
membership
48.  Britain  and  Germany,  which  were  supportive  of  Turkish  accession  at
governmental levels, are also facing opposition from the public. Recent polls have shown
that citizens’ approval in Germany is around 30% only.  Thus, one of the biggest challenge
for the EU consists in preparing opinion, which in several countries is overwhelmingly hostile
to  Turkey's  membership.   Some  leaders,  in  the  Member  States,  will  wish  to  protect
themselves from domestic opposition by emphasising the importance of the Commission
recommendation and the decision of the European Council.
4.3.  Long term impact of the decision
Turkish membership will have institutional, economic and geopolitical implications for the
EU
49. It is argued here that geopolitical developments will be altered, but in a way that is
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difficult to predict, and dependant on the EU’s own capacity to develop a single voice in the
area of foreign policy (§4.3.2). Economic implications will be significant but manageable
(§4.3.3). Turkish membership will have a more radical impact on the EU decision-making
process, for Turkey’s accession will alter the current institutional equilibrium between small
and big states (§4.3.1). But more than anything else, Turkish accession will have implications
as to what the European project itself is (§4.3.4).
4.3.1.   Institutional impact
Turkey is about the same size as the ten new Member States in population. Yet, the fact that
Turkey is one country, not ten, alters the political impact dynamics of its membership.
Turkey will have an important voice in the decision making process in view of its population
share which will be reflected in the Council voting system. If the European Constitution is
ratified by EU Member States – and the proposal for a “double-majority” system of voting
thus  implemented  –  then  Union  decisions  will  need  a  majority  of  both  countries  and
population. Given its population size, Turkey will be a powerful player and will add to the
already complex set of alliances and blocking combinations that are possible in the Council.
Also assessed on the basis of the rules set in the European Constitution, Turkey’s accession
will significantly affect the allocation of European Parliament seats of current Member States,
in particular the medium sized and large countries. The impact on the functioning of the
Commission will  be  less  important given  the  planned  reduction of  the  members  of  the
Commission from 2014 onwards. If the European Constitution is ratified and a Commission
with equal rotation of members across countries established, Turkey will sometimes have a
Commissioner and sometimes not, like all other EU Member States.
Turkey will inevitably have a considerable impact on the EU institutional arrangements. Its
accession will affect the delicate equilibrium between “small states” and “big states” reached
by EU leaders when negotiating the content of the European Constitution. Yet the fact that
Turkey will become the largest EU country in population terms will be mitigated by the fact
that Turkey will represent a small part of the EU economy. Turkey will unlikely be in a
position to lead strategically in developments in the internal market or the euro, which it is
unlikely to join before a number of years after accession.
4.3.2.   Geopolitical and foreign policy impacts
Located at the border of the Middle East and the Caucasus, Turkey is likely to offer new
opportunities for the CFSP.
By extending the EU’s borders to the Southern Caucasus and to Syria, Iran and Iraq, Turkish
accession will sharpen the EU’s foreign policy concerns in these regions. The EU is likely to
be increasingly involved in issues that were previously regarded as bilateral between Turkey
and its neighbours, such as disputes over water between Turkey and Syria or Armenia’s
diplomatic recognition.
Building on its strong historical, cultural and economic ties with the region, a reformed Turkey
could also help to stabilize Central Asia and encourage the development of democratic
values in a region which, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been subject to political
instability. In terms of foreign policy and security, Turkey’s role as the leading provider of
assistance in NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” programme across the region will strengthen
Central Asia’s international defence links. However, there are possible drawbacks in the
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extension of the EU’s frontiers closer to the region. For instance the existence of cultural and
political links between Turkey and Turkic-speaking parts of Central Asia, as well as the
presence in Turkey of certain Turkic groups opposing their domestic regimes, could fuel
tension in relations with countries in the region.
Finally, some have argued that Turkey as an EU member could provide the EU with a bridge
to the Middle East. Yet, Turkish-Arab relations have been troublesome, not least given the
strong relations between Turkey and Israel. Turkey’s relations with Middle East countries are
overwrought, with, as mentioned above, Turkey’s continuing dispute over water with Syria
and lingering fears that Iran is trying to export a fundamentalist revolution to Turkey. With the
arrival of the AKP government, Turkey has however taken up a more critical stance towards
Israel. The role that Turkey could play in connection to the Middle East is therefore difficult to
predict.
Turkish accession will extend EU foreign policy interests in new regions. However, given that
geopolitical  arguments  have  been  used  both  by  tenants  (new  borders  will  bring  new
opportunities) and opponents (new borders will bring instability) of Turkish accession, it is
difficult to forecast the exact direction of future foreign policy developments. Furthermore,
Turkey’s overall impact will depend on how much the EU itself will be able to develop as a
foreign policy player in the next decade. Turkey could be in a strong position to contribute to
the development of EU peacekeeping forces in the context of its developing security policy.
But for Turkey, and the EU itself, to become significant foreign policy players, EU Member
States need to find paths to overcome their divergences over foreign policy objectives and
the means to reach them.
4.3.3.   Economic impact
It is difficult to predict the economic situation of Turkey in 20-25 years time. However, Turkey
is not likely to have a major impact on the EU economy, given its small economic size.
Turkey’s GDP today is only 2% of the EU-25 GDP
50. Even assuming that Turkey’s annual
growth will reach 5%, Turkey’s GDP on the date of its accession will not be higher that 3% of
the EU-25 GDP
51.
Estimating Turkey’s likely impact on the EU budget is more difficult since the EU budget for
2015 is not yet known
52. The EU is currently negotiating its budget for the period 2007-2013.
Structural  policy  and  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  are  expected  to  change
considerably in the next ten years. Turkey will also change. Yet, it is possible to forecast that
Turkey’s GDP will still be well below the EU average by then, making Turkey an obvious
candidate for structural and regional assistance. In the same manner, it is also likely that
Turkey’s  agricultural sector  will  still  be  large.  On  that  basis,  Turkey  will  be  eligible  for
significant budget transfers from the Union, meaning that Turkish accession will have similar
financial implications than that of the ten new Member States.
Turkey’s demographic profile could however play a positive economic impact on the EU,
which is suffering from its aging demographic profile. Except that migration is also a sensitive
political issue.   There are fears within EU public opinion that freedom of movement could
allow for huge migratory flows from Turkey to the rest of the EU. Before the membership of
Greece, Spain and Portugal to the EU these worries also existed. However these fears did
not materialize. In any case, the EU has ensured that it could preserve the right to limit the
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right  to  freedom  of  movement  for  Turkish  labour  in  case  of  membership.  If  Turkish
immigration would be allowed, this would not take place until 2020 at the earliest, when the
EU’s aging population problem would start being felt.
The beneficial economic effects of Turkey’s membership in the EU are likely to be small for
the EU-25 and much larger for Turkey. A possible increase in labour supply, stemming from
migration from Turkey, could however contribute to some additional growth for the EU. The
effects on the EU will also depend on the way the Turkish economy will be able to cope with
its preparation for membership.
4.3.4. What the Decision means for the European project
The perspective of Turkish membership has raised questions concerning the nature of the
European project. In an article published in the Financial Times in November 2004, Valéry
Giscard d'Estaing, the chief architect of the European Constitution, has added his voice to
those calling for a “privileged partnership” for Turkey, as opposed to full EU membership.
Giscard d'Estaing argued that Turkish entry to the EU would “change the nature of the
European project”
53. What Turkish accession will mean for the European project has raised
very different types of answers. At the heart of this debate lie very different conceptions of
the European project itself and of the nature and objectives of the European Union.
For some, admitting Turkey means that the possibility of a United States of Europe – the
federal dream at the heart of the European project – would be shattered. The EU would
cease to be a political project and instead have to rest content with remaining a free-trade
zone. After Turkish accession, the only way the original spirit of Europe would survive would
be through the creation of a core Europe by the original founding members. A number of
federalists argue this way, as they did already before the Eastern European enlargement.
For others, EU membership is neither predrawn nor predestined but the result of a process of
social, cultural, economic and political convergence between countries and citizens, who for
many different reasons are capable of thinking of themselves as Europeans. In that light,
including Turkey would mean that Europe is capable of managing difference and draw
strength from its diversity. It would also send a message to the rest of the world about the
compatibility of Islam and democracy, that would challenge the view that we are now going
towards a “clash of civilisations”
54.
What Turkish accession will mean for the European project depends on the way the EU will
be able to adapt its institutional system to successive rounds of enlargement. In this respect,
the possible risk to drift towards a “free-trade” zone is not specifically related to the Turkish
enlargement. But what Turkey’s accession means for the EU will also depend on domestic
developments within Turkey, namely Turkey’s ability to commit to democracy while lessening
the control of the military over the state.
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CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analysed the specificities of the Turkish enlargement, the basis on which the
Commission recommended the opening of the negotiations, and the implications of the
European Council’s Decision for the EU. Because the Turkish enlargement bears  clear
specificities, the impact of Turkey’s accession would also have particular consequences for
the EU.
The Turkish enlargement is specific. If Turkish accession could, at first sight, be compared to
that of the CEECs (Turkey is about the same size as the ten new Member States taken
together in population and approximately the size of Poland, in economic terms), the fact that
Turkey is only one country, not ten, means that the political impact of its accession would be
quite  different.  The  EU  also  faces,  for  the  first  time,  the  challenge  of  negotiating  the
accession of a country that has different religious and cultural characteristics. Finally, unlike
no other enlargement before, the Turkish one has been analysed essentially by reference to
geopolitical arguments, which, ironically, are used both by tenants of Turkish accession and
by its opponents.
Given the specificities of the Turkish enlargement, the impact of Turkish accession for the EU
would also have unprecedented consequences:
ß  Economic implications will be significant, but manageable. The economic impact of
the Turkish enlargement on the EU will not be heavier than that of the Eastern
European enlargement.
ß  Turkish membership will have a more radical impact on the EU decision-making
process,  for  Turkey’s  accession  will  modify  the  current  institutional  equilibrium
between small and big states and add to the complexity of the EU decision-making
process.  In  this  respect,  the  reform  of  the  EU  institutional  system  towards  an
increased communautarisation of EU policies could provide a guarantee against the
risk  that  the  EU  would  drift  towards  being  a  “free-trade  zone”  in  the  wake  of
successive rounds of enlargements.
ß  Geopolitical developments will be altered, but in a way that is difficult to predict.
Turkey will have an important impact on EU foreign policy interests given its borders
with the Middle East, Caucasus and the Black Sea. It could also play a key role with
respect to the EU’s future energy supplies. Yet, the geopolitical impact of Turkish
accession is dependant on the EU’s own capacity to develop a single voice in the
area of foreign policy.
ß  Finally, Turkish accession will leave the EU with the unprecedented challenge of
managing an enlargement that provoked strong resistance among European citizens.
Whether Turkish accession is accepted by European citizens will also depend on
other parameters. The economic situation of the EU, the integration of minorities in
Member States and the geopolitical state of the world – and more specifically the way
the EU and international institutions will be able to fight against new security issues
such as international terrorism – will all play an important role as to how Turkey’s
accession will be perceived by European citizens and dealt with by policy-makers.